Savage Tales volume 2 (1986), unpublished story page 3 by Glanzman

"Cry My Son My Son," or perhaps "Cry My Son," by Sam Glanzman. He probably wrote and drew the story in 1986 for his "Of War and Peace: Tales of Mas" series in Savage Tales, which may have been scheduled for issue #9, cover date February 1987, before Marvel cancelled the book. "Mas" is Sam spelled backwards. (Thanks to Dewey Cassell for solving the mystery for me. Occam's razor!)

Sam's war stories and recollections ran in Savage Tales #6, #7, and #8.

Historical note: "Several attempts by (Admiral) Halsey to maneuver the fleet to areas more conducive to refueling put parts of the fleet directly in the path of the storm, unfortunately...Halsey’s biggest mistake was waiting too long to give individual ships the okay to break out of formation to ride out the storm independently, giving the order only at 1149 (although some commanding officers were already doing so on their own initiative). Others who tried too long to stay in formation caused their ships to take an even worse beating than necessary." (Naval History and Heritage Command)

"The Court of Inquiry placed responsibility for losses and storm damage on Admiral Halsey but ascribed no negligence, stating that Halsey’s mistakes 'were errors in judgment committed under stress of war operations and stemming from a commendable desire to meet military requirements.' In retrospect, Halsey should not have attempted any refueling operations on the morning of 18 December, but that would have required him to know where the center of the typhoon was before he did." (Naval History and Heritage Command)

"The Court...also determined that the commanding officers of (destroyers) Hull, Monaghan, and Spence maneuvered too long in an attempt to keep station, which 'prevented them from concentrating early enough on saving their ships.' In the opinion of Rear Admiral Samuel Eliot Morison, it was 'too much to expect of junior destroyer skippers—classes of 1937 and 1938, Naval Academy—to have pitted their brief experience against the lack of typhoon warnings and their own want of fuel.'" (Naval History and Heritage Command)